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Abstract 
In France, the intervention of the state in the private sphere has long been 
accepted as legitimate. The current French family policy is the result of  a 
compromise between the objectives of raising fertility,  providing income support 
to families and promoting the work-family balance. Thus it includes a wide range 
of measures based on a variety of ideological standpoints. It combines measures 
encouraging women’s employment with others in favour of large families. 
Recently, employers have been encouraged to implement family-friendly policies 
of their own. Since the state family policy is already quite comprehensive, their 
participation is rather low. This long-term ‘mix of tools’ is likely to be a factor 
behind the current high fertility in France, but the number and the complexity of 
family policy measures make it very difficult to quantify their overall effect on 
fertility. 
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1  Introduction 
Because of the variegated nature of its family policy, France does not fit easily 
into the classification of western welfare systems. Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) 
classifies European countries into three groups according to the organisation of 
their welfare systems. The Nordic countries have universalistic state policies that 
promote the independence of individuals and social equality; the state is the main 
welfare provider (socialist or universalistic welfare regimes). English-speaking 
countries promote market-based individualism; families and the market provide 
the welfare (liberal welfare regimes). In conservative welfare regimes, (including 
France and Germany) policies are geared at preserving the status quo and 
traditional family forms; they mostly depend on the family to provide welfare. 
Mediterranean countries are like conservative states but have a stronger family 
bias. However, in other classifications which we describe below, France is 
considered closer to the Nordic countries than to Germany.  
Feminist researchers consider the interaction of two types of relations within 
the family when classifying European welfare policies, namely partnership and 
parenthood (Neyer 2003). Gornick et al. (1997) focus on the impact of social 
policies on female employment. They group France, Belgium, Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden as countries where social policies help women to remain in the 
labour force after they have a child. In Germany, the Netherlands and Italy, family 
policies force women to exit the labour market until their children go to school. In 
the United Kingdom, family policies provide limited support and the ability of 
mothers to stay in the labour force depends on individual capacities. Anttonen and 
Sipila (1996) distinguish different types of state child care policies: the 
Scandinavian model (universal policies aimed at promoting gender equality); the 
southern European model (limited supply of state care services); France and 
Belgium, with extensive state support for families but no support for gender 
equality; the Netherlands and Germany, where child care is still provided by 
parents who benefit from state support schemes; and the British system, in which 
state help is mostly directed towards ‘problem cases’. 
Hantrais (2004) puts the relation between family and state into three 
categories. In her classification, the Nordic and French-speaking countries are 
‘defamilialised’ (strong state support for the care of family members); the English 
and German-speaking countries and the Netherlands are ‘partially familialised’; 
and the southern countries are ‘familialised’. McDonald (2006), simplifying 
matters even further, defines two groups of countries. The first includes the 
countries of southern Europe and the German-speaking European countries where 
“there is a strong, traditional value that family and state are separate entities and 
that families should support their own members” (ibid, p. 11) and where fertility 
levels are below 1.5 children per women. The other group includes all English-
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higher, there are family-friendly institutional arrangements and fertility levels are 
higher than 1.5.  
The multi-facetted French family policy may explain these various 
classifications. This article gives an overview of that policy. It first provides a 
presentation of its evolution over time. It then describes the different measures 
implemented and actors involved. Finally, it examines the impact of French 
family policy on fertility and female employment. In this article, we shall 
consider family policies in a broad sense, in that we include social and public 
policies which may help families raise their children and which, in the long run, 
contribute to maintaining high fertility. Indeed, some measures relating to such 
matters as education or housing, which were not designed to help families to have 
children, in fact do have an impact on fertility.  
 
 
2  A long tradition of family policy 
French family policy is the result of the centuries-long political will of an early-
formed central state to affirm itself against the power of the Catholic Church 
(Commaille and Martin 1998; Commaille et al. 2002; Strobel 2004). By 
regulating the family sphere, the Republican state sought to beat the Church on its 
preferred ground and affirm its own power. These efforts were aided at the end of 
the 19th century by a strong pronatalist movement that stemmed from the early 
end of the historical fertility transition in France and the country’s defeat in the 
1870 war against Germany (Rosental 2003). The family policy that was finally 
implemented after World War Two was a compromise between a Catholic vision 
of the family and more progressive ideals of social equality. For example, the 
entire policy was based on the male breadwinner and female caregiver pattern, but 
the development of kindergartens, introduced at the same time, was meant to 
promote equal opportunities among French children. Family policy has always 
been a tool for regulating women’s place between the private and work spheres 
and has been connected with employment policy (Commaille et al. 2002). From 
the 1930s to the 1960s, this policy reinforced the pattern of the non-working 
mother, because family allowance was paid from the first child onwards when the 
woman did not work. The policy was adapted further in the 1980s to 
accommodate the massive influx of women onto the labour market. Collective 
and private care arrangements were developed for children under three, which 
helped women to reconcile family and work with almost no increase in men’s 
participation in child care. 
This long history of considering family policy enabled the government to 
react swiftly to women’s entry into the labour force by designing new policy 
measures. The current policy is the result of a century-long battle, fuelled by 
pronatalism, between the conservative supporters of family values and the 
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The current French family policy is the result of  a compromise between 
various political trends and thus includes a wide range of measures based on a 
variety of ideological standpoints. Up to 2007, the yearly Conférence de la famille 
was the place where new family policy measures were set out. Extensive dialogue 
with family movement associations, social protection bodies, union and 
management representatives and experts preceded this conference. Religious 
institutions played a rather minor role. In 2008, the new French government has 
declared its intention to replace it by a new Haut conseil de la famille with a 
prominent role given to family movement associations.  
This intervention of the state in the private sphere has long been accepted as 
legitimate. The state is perceived as the main stakeholder responsible for children 
(Letablier et al. 2003). The consensus on the importance of state intervention goes 
beyond the political divide between right and left. However, there are 
divergences. Left-wing parties want family policy to be directed towards the 
poorest and to adapt to changes in the family behaviour. Considerations of gender 
equality have recently been advanced. Right-wing parties exhibit their pronatalist 
views more openly. Family policy should allow women to both raise their 
offspring and have more children. Moreover, right-wing parties advocate 
universal coverage for family policy, which should be distinguished from social 
policy.  
In spite of a relatively high level of fertility in France compared with other 
European countries, the pro-birth tendency is still present in the political arena. It 
is more present in right-wing parties, but it is also deeply rooted in some left-wing 
parties. This tendency expresses both family and collective morality and is more 
rationalistic than religious (Büttner et al. 2002). Its supporters are still anxious 
about the insufficient replacement of generations and call for increased support 
for families, particularly large families (Godet and Sullerot 2006; Franco 2006).  
Current concerns have gradually shifted from the number of births to 
reconciling work and family (Ministère de la famille 2005). Family policy is 
designed to encourage mothers’ ‘free choice’ to continue to work or to stop 
working to raise their children. The idea is that women should not be penalised, 
whatever their choice, and that public policies should help women to have the 
desired number of children.  
 
 
3  Mix of tools 
France has a rather generous and diversified family benefit system. Public 
expenditure for families is quite high. According to Eurostat data, it was 2.8 per 
cent of the GDP in 2003, which is higher than the EU-25 average (2.1%), behind 
only Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Luxemburg and Germany. However, the 
Eurostat nomenclature does not take into account all benefits for families (such as 
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schooling). Including fiscal support for families, the state contribution is 
estimated to be 3.6 per cent of the GDP. Hence, France may be seen as the 
European country with the most substantial family policy (Adema and Ladaique 
2005). 
The originality of French family policy is that it mixes pro-birth objectives 
and objectives of family assistance (Hantrais and Letablier 1996). This 
compromise between promoting families versus promoting the work-family 
balance and women’s employment has repercussions for the types of measures 
offered to families (see Appendix for a summary of legal family benefits).  
 
3.1  Measures encouraging women’s employment 
Since the 1970s, a whole range of facilities, services and allowances linked with 
working status have accompanied increasing female participation in the labour 
force. First, the early socialisation of children through crèches  and  écoles 
maternelles or nursery schools has been encouraged. The number of crèches has 
increased since 1983. Crèche fees are means-tested and parents may also claim 
tax deductions. Unlike in northern European countries, this type of care is 
available immediately after the end of maternity leave, i.e. from when the baby is 
two or three months old, and the hours covered are extensive: on weekdays from 
7:00-8:00 to 18:00-19:00. The école maternelle is a specifically French institution 
created in 1881 and enlarged during the 1970s and 1980s, during which period the 
number of places doubled. This service is available from the age of two; it is free 
of charge and of high quality. The stated objective of this form of early collective 
socialisation is not to allow women to combine motherhood and work but to 
ensure equal opportunities for all children, whatever their social class, in 
accordance with the French Republican secular tradition. Nevertheless, in 
practice, this service greatly helps mothers to reconcile family and work. The 
hours covered by the service are long: School hours are from 8:30 to 16:30 for 
children aged 3 to 12 and care facilities are provided before and after school hours 
from 7:00 to 8:30 and from 16:30 to 18:00-19:00. 17 per cent of all children aged 
two to six use these facilities after school. Moreover, care facilities and school 
meals are available during lunch time. Wednesday is a school-free day, but 
‘leisure centres’ take over. In 2002, 37 per cent of all children aged two were 
enrolled and 97 per cent at age three, despite the fact that this schooling is not 
compulsory (Blanpain 2006).  
France dedicates only one quarter of its family expenditure to in-kind benefits 
and the share of cash benefit has grown over the years. As child care facilities are 
costly and in order to create employment, private systems that are more 
individualised and flexible have been developed. Subsidised childminders, 
allowances and tax deductions have become new tools of family policy. Since 
1980, an allowance paid to families with children under three (and then six) years 
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reduced child care costs. In 1986, another allowance was introduced for families 
who employ nannies to look after their children in the family home. Moreover, 
parents could deduct half of the cost incurred from their income tax. Some 70 per 
cent of the total cost of child care may be covered (Fagnani 1998). Moreover, 
families who employ someone to look after their children after school or on 
Wednesdays may claim tax deductions with the chèque emploi service universel, 
a pre-financed voucher to simplify formalities when employing home help 
services. Finally, according to a recent survey on child care, on weekdays, 61 per 
cent of all children under three years of age are cared for mainly by their parents, 
21 per cent by subsidised childminders, 10 per cent in a crèche, seven per cent by 
their grandparents or family and one per cent by nannies at home (Blanpain 2006; 
Ruault and Daniel 2003).  
In 1994, family policy came to a crossroad. The family policy reform, which 
had been implemented in a context of high unemployment, had the opposite 
intention of creating incentives to leave the labour force. The allocation parentale 
d’éducation (APE) was designed to allow one of the parents (in practice, mothers) 
to devote themselves entirely to bringing up the newborn child until its third 
birthday. For a period of three years after a birth of order 3 or more, parents who 
stop working to raise their youngest child receive a fixed amount of money. 
Parents who decide to work part-time receive a partial allocation. This allocation 
has existed since 1985, but before 1994 it was available only after the third child. 
In 1994, it was made available to parents of a second child. The goal was mainly 
to reduce public expenditure. This reform had a great impact on the number of 
recipients, which tripled in three years, to about 500,000 (of whom only 2 per cent 
are fathers). In 2004, all existing infancy benefits were unified into a single one: 
the prestation d’accueil du jeune enfant (PAJE). The APE was replaced by the 
complément libre choix d’activité of the prestation d’accueil du jeune enfant 
(PAJE) and was made available for the first child for six months after birth.
1 Even 
if the take-up rate has not reached the level of northern countries, it is quite high: 
10 per cent after a first birth, 30 per cent for second births and 39 per cent for 
births of order 3 and over (Mahieu 2005). The take-up rate for part-time parental 
leave is rather low: five per cent, 20 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively. The 
amount of this leave benefit is much lower than the minimum wage and is not 
proportional to the income gained before birth (see Appendix). A debate arose 
regarding the need to encourage high-income men and women to take the leave 
and to reduce its negative effect on the career path. So, since 2006, parents of at 
least three children have been able to choose between a one-year leave with a 
higher benefit and a three-year leave with lower benefit.  
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3.2  Measures encouraging large families 
Besides the aim to reduce tensions between work and family, several measures 
have been designed to reduce the cost of children since the end of World War 
Two. As in southern countries, these allowances are directed specifically towards 
families with three or more children (Breton and Prioux 2005). They vary with 
the age of the children. Universal family benefits are available, but in France they 
are only granted from the second child onwards and are progressive. For instance, 
the allowances paid for families that have three children are 2.3 times higher than 
those for families that have two children, and 3.6 times higher for families with 
four children. Several means-tested allowances are also available, e.g. the core 
allowance of PAJE for families that have at least one child under three. The 
complement familial is substituted for these allowances for families that have at 
least three children when the youngest reaches the age of three. A means-tested 
allowance is granted to single mothers until the youngest child reaches the age of 
three. On the other hand, a special tax rule called quotient familial favours 
families that have at least three children and pay tax. The French tax system is not 
individual-based but family-based and from the third child onwards each 
additional child counts as one tax unit (instead of one half), which leads to 
significant tax deductions. This is a purely pro-birth measure.
2  
 
3.3  A new contributor: the employers 
Some companies’ practices may also be considered as ‘family policies’. In 
France, government family policies and the Labour Law entitle employees to 
certain basic rights—such as maternity or paternity leave, parental leave, three 
days of leave to care for a sick child each month—to help them reconcile work 
and family life. These rights are reinforced in some cases by collective labour 
agreements or by the civil-service statutes. Recently, employers have been 
encouraged to implement their own family-friendly policies, either directly or via 
a works council. For instance, the ‘family tax credit’ was introduced on 1 January 
2004 with the aim of encouraging companies to implement child care provisions. 
This tax credit represents 25 per cent of the amounts spent, up to a maximum of 
€500,000 per year and employer, for the creation of day care centres for 
employees’ children aged under three, training employees on parental leave, 
supplementary payments for paternity, maternity, parental or sick child leave and 
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children as half a unit and all subsequent children as one full unit each. Unmarried couples 
cannot merge their incomes and tax units; the children living with the couple must be attributed 
to one of the two partners. Lone parents (but not unmarried couples) are allowed to count each 
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payment of employees’ exceptional child care expenses due to unforeseeable 
work commitments outside normal working hours. However, in 2005, a year after 
the introduction of the ‘family tax credit’, only one per cent of all establishments 
that had not yet offered day care places were planning to do so in the future 
(Lefèvre et al. 2007). 
Another measure implemented recently to develop employers’ participation is 
related to the creation of the chèque emploi service universel. Companies are 
encouraged to finance these on behalf of their staff in whole or in part and are, as 
a result, granted payroll and other tax reductions.  
According to a recent study on French employers’ practices directed towards 
families, employers’ family-friendly policies most often take the form of financial 
support rather than benefits in kind (Lefèvre et al. 2007). Occasional benefits and 
services are much more common than those granted on a regular basis. Corporate 
day care centres are still very rare, for example, despite the fact that employers 
attach importance to the provision of child care. Some employers nonetheless 
offer a certain degree of flexibility in working hours or agree to informal 
arrangements, often on a case-by-case basis. A wide range of benefits is offered 
by public-sector companies and the civil service, often targeting families with 
children. In the private sector, the measures implemented, if any, mainly concern 
financial support and less family-oriented benefits such as insurance fund 
contributions.  
 
3.4  Other social policy measures 
Other social policy measures, which do not directly target ‘family’ or ‘maternity’ 
risks, create transfers for households according to their composition. For instance, 
the situation of the family has been taken into account in housing policies since 
1948 (Aglietta et al. 2002). Some basic welfare benefits also take into account the 
number of children. 
French family policy is a mix of many tools: No fewer than 28 different 
measures are aimed at the family (Aglietta et al. 2002; Godet and Sullerot 2005; 
Algava and Bressé 2005). It combines ‘horizontal’ redistribution towards families 
that have the same income (from people living alone or with no children to 
families in order to ‘compensate’ for the cost of childrearing and let them have 
the same standard of living) with ‘vertical’ redistribution aiming at diminishing 
social differences (Bechtel et al. 2005a).  
The number and the complexity of family policy measures make an 
evaluation almost impossible, because the specific effect of each measure is 
mixed with other effects. All in all, the government adapts policy measures or 
creates new ones (each year, a specific announcement is made at the Conference 
de la famille). French family policy gives the impression that the state helps all 
families, irrespective of their way of life and their standard of living. In 1997, the 
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practice, this involved only 2 per cent of households in the highest income 
bracket, but there was wide opposition to this measure on the grounds that the 
allowances had to remain universal. In 1998, the government made the 
allowances universal again, but restricted the advantage gained from the Quotient 
familial. In purely financial terms, the two measures were very similar, but the 
latter was well received, because it limited an income tax reduction, while the 
former had been refused, because it went against the dogma of universal family 
allowances.  
However, in the long run, the net level of allowances has fallen over the years, 
due to inflation and increasing expenditure on the elderly (Thélot and Villac 
1998), despite the fact that in recent years new measures were implemented which 
compensate for this decline (Bechtel et al. 2005b). The pro-birth objective is 
weaker but still present. Unlike in Scandinavian countries, the objective of gender 
equality is rather low on the agenda. Family policy is only directed towards 
mothers, because reconciling work and family is women’s business (Commaille et 
al. 2002). The goal of gender equality within the family was not raised until very 
recently. The ‘socialist’ population policy in 1997-2002 aimed to introduce a 
‘feminist’ family policy that would help both parents to reconcile work and 
family. This took the form of statutory paternal child care leave in 2002. This 
measure is rather timid (its maximum duration is 11 days) but has been a success: 




4  Impact of family policy 
4.1  Effect of family policies on fertility 
Family benefits reduce the cost of having children; hence, one may expect a 
positive relationship between family policy and fertility. Measuring the impact on 
fertility is complex and very sensitive to the method and data used (Hoem 2008). 
One can measure the short-term effects of policies, whereas long-term trends are 
more difficult to evaluate. These long-term trends rather depend on a favourable 
context for families than on specific family policies. Studies generally find that 
direct cash benefits are positively related to fertility but that the effect appears to 
be small (Gauthier and Hatzius 1997; Ekert-Jaffé 1986). For instance, French 
family benefits are estimated to increase fertility by 0.2 children per woman on 
average (Blanchet and Ekert-Jaffé 1994). The targeting of family allowances on 
families with three or more children also has a clear effect on the progression to 
third births and the timing of births in France (Ekert-Jaffé et al. 2002; Breton and 
Prioux 2005), but the effect is small. Moreover, family policies tend to erase the 
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The changes in the rules concerning the APE, particularly its extension to 
parents of two children in 1994, may be viewed as a sort of ‘natural experiment’ 
regarding the impact such an allowance has on fertility and women’s professional 
activity. The direct impact on fertility has been very limited, while the effect on 
female participation in the labour force has been large. Estimated by the 
‘difference in difference’ method, estimates give the following orders of 
magnitude, for some 200,000 women with a full-time allowance: Around 100,000 
women would have stopped working in any case after the birth of their second 
child, even without the APE, and the annual number of births may have increased 
by some 12,000 because of the change in behaviour due to the APE (Piketty 
2005), i.e. 1.6 per cent of yearly births. This effect is smaller than current 
fluctuations from one year to another. Using a micro-simulation model, Laroque 
and Salanié (2004) also conclude that financial incentives play a rather modest 
role in fertility decisions. They estimate that the extension of the APE to second 
births has caused parity 2 births to increase by 11 per cent, but has caused parity 3 
births to fall by around three per cent. However, their model does not take into 
account timing effects and probably overestimates the impact in the long run. 
Between 1994 and 2000, the number of births in France increased by 63,000, 
from 711,000 to 774,000, and the change in the APE is surely not the cause of 
such a large change.  
 
4.2  Impact of the 1994 child care allowance reform on 
participation in the labour force  
The 1994 reform led to a large decline in young mothers’ participation in the 
labour force. Participation on the labour market has decreased rapidly for mothers 
of two children who have at least one child under three (within three years, the 
activity rate fell from 69 per cent in 1994 to 54 per cent in 1997, i.e. the level 
observed 15 years earlier). It is estimated that this leave has been an incentive to 
withdraw from the labour force for at least 112,000 women per year (Afsa 1998; 
Piketty 2005). Nevertheless, on average, job breaks are relatively short. Half of all 
parity 1 mothers who stop working return after 18 months and half of all mothers 
of parity 2 or 3 do so after two years. Mothers who had their first child after 1994, 
and were not directly affected by the APE reform, tend to stop for shorter periods 
than older women. Those who had a third child after 1994, equally unaffected by 
the change, were more likely than preceding cohorts to return to work when the 
APE ceased, or even earlier. Conversely, among those who had their second child 
after 1994, the cohort trend of a rapid return to work was neutralised by the 
change in family policy. Some of these mothers now wait until the child is three 
(end of APE and enrolment in nursery school) before returning to work. After 
three years, they are now more likely to return than the preceding cohorts (Pailhé 
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Less educated women, who have insecure jobs, poor working conditions or 
unfavourable work schedules are more likely to leave the labour force after the 
birth of a child. A combination of factors affects the decision to leave the labour 
force. Although women’s wages, and to a lesser degree those of their partners, do 
play a role, the worsening of working conditions and employment opportunities 
has greatly contributed to the success of the 1994 child care allowance reform 
(Marc 2004). Parental leave is taken under duress for a large share of women: one 
half of all mothers who took paid parental leave stated that they would have 
preferred to keep on working if their working conditions had been different or if 
child care had been available (Méda et al. 2003).  
The concern about the risk of greater difficulties in finding work after this 
period of three years (Bonnet and Labbé 1999) has not been borne out. Women 
who take parental leave are at risk of unemployment when they return to the 
labour market because of their low level of education, not because of their having 
taken parental leave. Nevertheless, ceteris paribus, women who return to work 
after parental leave find less qualified jobs than women who did not take such a 
leave (Algava and Bressé 2005). 
 
 
5  Conclusion 
The continuing increase in the French TFR since 1995 may not be simply related 
to one specific policy measure. Fertility rates at ages below 25 are currently 
stable, which could be related to the stable age at the end of studies since 1995 
(Durier 2006), while fertility rates at higher ages are still increasing at the same 
pace. In any case, since 1975, the overall level of fertility has been almost stable 
(Toulemon et al. 2008). The French family policy, by contrast, changes 
continually. On the one hand, most measures are price-indexed, so their weight in 
the GNP is structurally decreasing; on the other hand, new measures are 
introduced yearly, and the Conference de la famille is organised explicitly to 
emphasise the fact that the state wants to help the families by showcasing new 
measures that are implemented (Bechtel et al. 2005b). This long-lasting ‘mix of 
tools’ is very likely related to the current high fertility in France, but it is very 
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Appendix 
Table A1: 
Legal family benefits in France 

















0 to 20  No  Only dependent children are 
taken into account: no benefit 
when the child earns a minimum 
personal income. Lump-sum 
benefit. No benefit for the first 
child. Extra benefit for children 
aged over 11 and over 16. 
117 € for 
two children, 










to age 3 
Yes  First pillar of the prestation 
d’accueil du jeune enfant 
(PAJE). Includes a one-time 
payment at the 7th month of 
pregnancy and a monthly 
allowance from birth until the 
3rd birthday of the child. Only 
10 per cent of all families are 












de libre choix 
du mode de 
garde) 
0 to 6  Partially  Second pillar of the prestation 
d’accueil du jeune enfant. 
Compensation for parents who 
entrust their children to nurses, 
either at home or at the nurse’s 
home. The benefit is paid per 
child for out-of-home nursery 
and per family for at-home 
nursery. The amount of the 
benefit decreases with family 
income (three thresholds) and is 
half for children aged 3 to 6. 
From 553 € 
to 763 € for 
out-of-home 
nursery; 
from 421 € 










de libre choix 
d’activité) 
0 to 1  
or 0 to 3 
No  Third pillar of the prestation 
d’accueil du jeune enfant. 
Allowance for parents who 
partially or totally stop working 
to look after their children of 
parity 2 and over. For parity 3 
and over, parents may choose 
between a one-year high amount 
benefit or a three-year low 
amount benefit. Adjusted for 
parents who change from a full-
time to a part-time job. 
Recipients of basic allowance get 
a reduced amount of benefit. 
Subject to conditions on past 
occupation. 
1 year: 
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Table A1 (continued) 

















0 to 20  Yes  Supplementary allowance for 
families with three children or 
more. Cannot be received 
concurrently with basic 
allocation. Around 20 per cent 
of all families are excluded by 
the means test. 






6 to 17  Yes  One-time allowance paid at the 
start of the new school year to 
families for each child going to 
school. Around 50 per cent of 
all families are excluded by the 
means test. 






0 to 20  No  Allowance for persons who 
take care of a child when one 
parent or both parents are 
missing. In the case of a 
divorced parent, it serves as an 
advance on maintenance 
allowance. 
82 € (one 
missing 
parent), 








0 to 3  Yes  Minimum income, e.g. 
differential allowance: the 
amount is calculated as the 
difference between the 
maximum amount of this lone 
parent benefit and all the 
personal incomes of the single 
parent. 
736 € for 1 











Birth  Partially  Wage compensation for fathers 
(with an income ceiling) who 
take a maximum of 11 days 





of 69 € a day 
200 
Source: Caussat (2006). 